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less rigid and abstract." Haar believes this "will call for review by
administrative agencies specializing in land transactions and private
property, by state and regional boards supervising local zoning efforts with an eye toward reinjecting considerations of the more general welfare, or by agencies directed toward reducing the cacophony
of present procedures."
Professor Haar's plea for more rigorous review of zoning decisions is surely sound, and, if understood, will shatter the myth that
zoning is a legislative, rather than an adjudicative, action. That single readjustment would itself bring a level of accountability and regularity to land use decisions that has long been absent. Beyond this,
Haar's is obviously a clarion call for new, creative forms of regulation, a demonstration of faith in the power and appropriateness of
government to design our physical environments, and in so doing,
to structure our lives. On this score, Professor Haar and I worship
in different churches. Yet one thing is certain, the intellectual contributions made by this single volume are significant, even if-at
zoning's party-a good time was not had by all.

PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLmES OF
THE BRmSH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES
1607-1788. By Jack P. Greene.• Athens, Ga.: The University
Press of Georgia. 1986. Pp. x, 274. Cloth, $30.00.
James Hutson 2

Despite the trendy title and subtitle, this is an old-fashioned
volume, addressing the old-fashioned question of the constitutional
dispute between Great Britain and her American colonies, which,
not yielding to peaceful settlement, resulted in the appeal to arms in
1776. Professor Jack Greene's approach, as he himself is the first to
admit, has much in common with the old, "imperial" school of
American history, dating back to the beginning of this century and
represented by the writings of such venerable scholars as Charles
Andrews and Charles Mcilwain. These writers contended that
American historians and legal scholars were too parochial in their
perspective, focusing as they did on the relationships between Great
Britain and the thirteen colonies that formed the United States in
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1776. To understand the constitutional developments in the First
British Empire, they argued, it was necessary to survey all of Britain's overseas colonies, especially those important ones in the West
Indies like Jamaica and Barbados, and to consider Ireland as well.
Professor Greene follows in these footsteps and documents an issue
in constitutional history as readily with a citation from the Leeward
Islands as from Massachusetts. His is one of the few volumes by a
modem American writer where the impact of the American
Revolution on the "constitutions" of the colonies that remained
loyal is discussed.
Greene's book focuses on the pre-independence period; seven
of the nine chapters deal with events before 1776. The two final
chapters cover the Confederation and Constitutional periods, but
contain few new insights, being essentially summaries of recent
literature, especially the works of Jack Rakove and Peter Onuf and
an affirmation of Andrew McLaughlin's old thesis that the Constitution of 1787 was essentially a copy of the "federal" constitution
which had evolved in the British Empire before 1776, with the central government being invested with control over war, trade, and
other "external" matters, and the state governments retaining control over "internal" concerns.
Greene defines the issue in dispute between Great Britain and
her colonies as the distribution of authority between the metropolis
and the separate governments that gradually arose in the overseas
territories. He makes no claim to originality in viewing the root of
the problem as the growth of the new theory of parliamentary sovereignty which was the major constitutional result of the Glorious
Revolution of 1689. The notion that the King-in-Parliament was
sovereign in the sense of having absolute power throughout the Empire was obviously inconsistent with the American view that Parliament could not do certain things in the colonies, the foremost of
which was to tax the inhabitants without their consent. Many historians have stressed that the American position, based on a belief
in sacrosanct fundamental law, as formulated by Lord Coke in Bonham's Case (1610), and articulated by colonial lawyers such as
James Otis in his Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved
(1764), was outmoded and even reactionary and that, therefore, the
British had the better legal arguments.
Professor Greene, in a manner reminiscent of the controversy
sixty years ago between Professors Schuyler and Mcilwain, enters
this dispute as a partisan of the colonists and claims that the American understanding of the nature of the Constitution was at least as
correct as the British one. Here he relies on what he calls the "new
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legal history literature," specifically, the writings of John Phillip
Reid, Barbara Black, and Thomas C. Grey, who, according to
Greene, have established that custom in eighteenth century British
constitutional thinking was good law and that, therefore, the customary arrangements in the American colonies, including legislative independence of the British Parliament, was as "correct" an
understanding of the constitution as the "modem" doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. To assume that theories such as sovereignty are correct because they are articulated by the center is, in
Greene's view, a common historical fallacy.
In my opinion Greene (and Reid before him) overemphasizes
the importance of custom, obscuring an important dimension in the
legal climate of revolutionary America. In making the British constitution and custom the sources of American rights, Reid and
Greene ignore natural law, to which Reid is intemperately hostile.
The First Continental Congress (1774) and a host of revolutionary
writers, including James Madison, considered natural law a principal source of American rights. To neglect natural law is to distort
the constitutional and political history of their period.
Despite this shortcoming, the book is an excellent historigraphical essay on the recent literature on the conflicting interpretations of the constitution of the First British Empire and the
consequences of these different views. As such, it is an extremely
valuable synthesis that can be recommended to anyone who wishes
to read a compact, judicious, comprehensive survey of the last
twenty years' scholarship on a complex subject which has attracted
a vigorous amount of scholarship, even in an era in which social
history holds sway.

CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY
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Of one thing I am perfectly clear: that it is not by deciding the suit, but by compromising the difference, that peace can be restored or kept. They who would put an
end to such quarrels by declaring roundly in favor of the whole demands of either
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